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This paper investigates and confirms one advantageous function of a power packet dispatching
system, which has been proposed by authors’ group with being apart from the conventional power
distribution system. Here is focused on the function to establish the security of power packet
dispatching for prohibiting not only information but also power of power packet from being stolen
by attackers. For the purpose of protecting power packets, we introduce a simple encryption of
power packets before sending them. Encryption scheme based on chaotic signal is one possibility
for this purpose. This paper adopts the Differential Chaos Shift Keying (DCSK) scheme for the
encryption, those are partial power packet encryption and whole power packet encryption.
INTRODUCTION
In the context of the growth of renewable power sources
in electricity generation, a novel power packet dispatch-
ing system has been proposed for the purpose of man-
aging low power renewable power sources together with
commercial power sources and supplying power based on
demands [1–4]. The basic configuration of the power
packet dispatching system, which consists of DC power
sources, a mixer, power line, a router, and loads, is illus-
trated in Fig. 1. The mixer produces power packets by
switching selected power sources on and off based on its
clock frequency. The proposed configuration of one power
packet is presented in Fig. 2, which includes information
tags and payload [5]. In particular, useful information,
such as the power source and power destination (load
address), are the main part of the header. The footer is
the end signal of one power packet and the payload car-
ries electric power. Power packets are transmitted from
a mixer to a router through a power line in the Time-
Division Multiplexing (TDM) fashion. The router is in
charge of determining the route for each power packet
according to the information attached in the header and
transferring power to the requested load [2, 6, 7]. For
the sake of recognition of the packet signal in the router
so as to determine the route for power packets precisely,
the clock synchronization between the mixer and router is
required. Different clock synchronization methods have
been employed in the power packet dispatching system.
In [6] the clock synchronization has been achieved by a
clock recovery circuit and in [8] an external clock line
is adopted for external synchronization. However, the
line connection for synchronization limits the extension
of system distribution, because of the delay and noise
generated by clock lines. The failure in synchronization
caused by the deficiency of external clock line is explained
theoretically in [9]. In [10], a first order control of digital
clock synchronization is applied and the clock synchro-
nization is achieved automatically between the mixer and
router with the aid of the preamble of power packet. The
preamble contains several cycles of the mixer clock signal.
The performance of clock synchronization is improved by
a second order control scheme in [5].
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FIG. 1: Basic configuration of power packet dispatching sys-
tem. Power packets are generated in the mixer and transmit-
ted to the router. The power contained in each power packet
is dispatched to the load designated by the information tags
of the power packet.
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FIG. 2: Basic composition of one power packet. The preamble
is several cycles of mixer clock signal used to achieve the clock
synchronization, the header includes useful information, the
payload carries power and the footer indicates the end of one
power packet.
The security of power packet dispatching is defined as
protecting the content of power packet, which consists
of both information tags and power, from unknown con-
sumer (attacker). For the system in Fig. 1, when an
attacker who exists between the mixer and the router
receives power packets, he may deduce the packet sig-
nal and then obtain private information of consumers.
With respect to power, the attacker can steal the power
if he connects some devices directly to the power line.
In other words, there is no security in the basic power
packet dispatching system according to the definition of
security. We can easily imagine that the attacker may
even change the information purposely and then send
the tampered packet to the router. In doing so, he may
give rise to wrong power dispatching, which will possibly
2cause a damage to the running system. Considering the
consumers’ privacy and safety of the system, the security
of power packet between the mixer and router should
be established. For this purpose, we propose to encrypt
power packets before sending them.
Spread spectrum communications have been widely
used in secure communication field. The uniform spread-
ing of spectrum is one of the desired features in encryp-
tion. This is because the spectrum may be one of the
clues for decryption. Besides that, a message may be hid-
den in the background noise by spreading its bandwidth
with coding and by transmitting signal at a low averaged
power, which is called a low-probability-of-intercept [11].
Chaotic sequences are very appealing for the use as carri-
ers in Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) system
due to their broad band spectrum. They can spread spec-
trum more uniformly compared with the conventional se-
quences such as the Gold sequence and Walsh-Hadamard
sequence as described in [12]. Power spread is also con-
sidered in [13, 14]. The possibility of synchronization be-
tween chaotic systems was reported by Pecora and Car-
roll [15–17]. After that, many chaos-based communica-
tion systems had been proposed and analyzed [12, 18–31].
In the power packet dispatching system, power packet
is generated in digital form. Hence, digital encryption
scheme is required. Chaos Shift Keying (CSK) scheme
with coherent detection was firstly proposed in [18, 20] to
encode digital symbols with chaotic signals. However, the
sensitive dependence of chaotic signals upon initial condi-
tion makes it very difficult to replica signal in the receiver
[25]. Therefore, in chaos-based communication systems,
non-coherent detection of received signal has advantage
over coherent detection. The Differential Chaos Shift
Keying (DCSK) scheme is a typical non-coherent chaos-
based communication scheme [22], which also solves the
problem of threshold shift in non-coherent CSK system
[25]. In view of features of the DCSK scheme, we investi-
gate the power packet encryption using DCSK scheme to
estabish the security of power packet dispatching in this
paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, the operating principles of DCSK scheme are summa-
rized according to references [22, 25] for its application to
power packet encryption. Section 3 presents two power
packet encryption methods using DCSK scheme, which
are partial power packet encryption and whole power
packet encryption. At the same time, the security status
of power packet is also discussed. Power transfer through
the modulator is analyzed and then examined through
simulations in Section 4. The final section is devoted for
the conclusions.
DIFFERENTIAL CHAOS SHIFT KEYING
The operating principles of the Differential Chaos Shift
Keying (DCSK) scheme was reported in [22, 25]. Fig-
ure 3(a) presents the block diagram of a DCSK mod-
ulator. In the scheme, every information bit period is
divided into two equal time slots, so that every bit bl can
be represented by two consecutive chaotic sequences: ref-
erence sequence and data sequence. Here, l ∈ N1 denotes
the serial number of information bits. In the first half bit
period, the chaotic signal xk is transmitted (k ∈ N1 in-
dicates the serial number of sample points of the chaotic
signal). During the second half bit period the data se-
quence is transmitted. The data sequence is determined
by bl and the reference sequence. When the informa-
tion bit to be sent is ‘1’, the data sequence is identical
to the reference sequence. Whereas, if the information
bit is ‘–1’, the data sequence is inverted to the reference
sequence. In this way, the data sequence carries infor-
mation bits. The representation of one information bit
b1 using DCSK scheme is exemplified in Fig. 4. Let Tb
and Tx represent the information bit period and the time
interval between two adjacent points of chaotic signal, re-
spectively. The relationship of Tb and Tx is given as
Tb = 2βTx, (1)
where 2β is referred to as the spreading factor in the
DCSK scheme (β ∈ N1). Consequenctly, the data se-
quence can be represented as {±xk−β}, k = β+1, β+2,
... , 2β for l = 1. The output signal of the DCSK mod-
ulator sk, i.e., the transmitted signal, during the l-th bit
period can be given as follows for bl =‘1’,
sk =


xk, (l − 1)2β + 1 ≤ k ≤ (l − 1)2β + β,
xk−β , (l − 1)2β + β + 1 ≤ k ≤ (l − 1)2β + 2β.
(2)
When a ‘–1’ is sent, sk can be expressed in a likewise
fashion,
sk =


xk, (l − 1)2β + 1 ≤ k ≤ (l − 1)2β + β,
−xk−β , (l − 1)2β + β + 1 ≤ k ≤ (l − 1)2β + 2β.
(3)
The block diagram of a DCSK demodulator [25] is pre-
sented in Fig. 3(b). The output of the correlator yl can be
obtained at the end of the l-th bit period by the following
equation.
yl =
(l−1)2β+2β∑
k=(l−1)2β+β+1
rkrk−β . (4)
Comparing yl with the threshold value of the threshold
detector, the information bit can be recovered at the out-
put of the demodulator as b′l. Suppose that the transmit-
ted signal sk passes through an Additive White Gaussian
3Noise (AWGN) channel [25]. The received signal rk can
be given as
rk = sk + ξk, (5)
where ξk represents the k-th sampling point of the white
Guassian noise which is assumed to be of zero mean and
variance as N0/2. If a ‘+1’ is transmitted, sk is as in
Eq. (2). Substituting Eqs. (2) and (5) into Eq. (4), yl
can be described in more detail as follows.
yl =
(l−1)2β+2β∑
k=(l−1)2β+β+1
rkrk−β
=
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
rk+βrk
=
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
(sk+β + ξk+β)(sk + ξk)
=
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
(xk + ξk+β)(xk + ξk)
=
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
x2k +
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
xk(ξk
+ ξk+β) +
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
ξkξk+β .
(6)
Let
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
x2k,
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
xk(ξk + ξk+β), and
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
ξkξk+β be denoted by A, B, and C, respec-
tively. A is related only to the chaotic signal xk and is
positive. B and C are noise interference. However, if a
‘–1’ is sent, sk is as in Eq. (3). Accordingly, yl becomes
yl =
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
(−x2k) +
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
[−xk(ξk + ξk+β)]
+
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
ξkξk+β .
(7)
Let
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
(−x2k) and
(l−1)2β+β∑
k=(l−1)2β+1
[−xk(ξk+ξk+β)] be
denoted by A′ and B′, respectively. A′ is also related
only to the chaotic signal xk but it is negative. Since
AWGN channel is assumed between the modulator and
demodulator, it can be deduced that both B (or B′) and
C have a zero mean. Therefore, the threshold value of the
detector can be set at zero optimally. As a consequence,
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FIG. 3: Block diagram of a non-coherent single-user DCSK
system. (a) modulator; xk and xk−β are chaotic signal and
its half-bit (β) delayed version, respectively. They are used to
represent the information bit bl. sk is the modulator output.
(b) demodulator. rk and rk−β are received signal and its half-
bit delayed version, respectively. yl is the convolution of rk
and rk−β during the l-th bit period while b
′
l is the recovered
l-th information bit. 2β is the spreading factor in the DCSK
scheme.
T βTx x2βT
reference sequence data sequence
Tb
k-β k=       ,..., 2β β+1  +_k k=1,2,..., β
blinformation bit:  l=1
x
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FIG. 4: Representation of one information bit b1 using DCSK
scheme. The information bit period Tb is divided into two
equal time slots. b1 is represented by two consecutive chaotic
sequence: reference sequence and data sequence ({xk} and
{±xk−β}). The sign of data sequence is determined by b1
(if b1= ‘1’, the data sequence is {xk−β}, otherwise, it is
{−xk−β}). Tx indicates the time interval between two ad-
jacent points of chaotic sequence (Tb=2βTx).
the information bit can be recovered through the detector
as
b′l =


‘ + 1’, yl > 0,
‘− 1’, yl < 0.
(8)
POWER PACKET ENCRYPTION
Given the principles of DCSK scheme in section , we
apply the scheme to encrypt power packet aiming to es-
tablish the security of power packet dispatching. When
the scheme is applied to power packet encryption, the
packet signals are encrypted as information bits in a
conventional DCSK modulator. In this section, two en-
4cryption methods for power packet will be discussed, i.e.,
partial power packet encryption and whole power packet
encryption. From the principle of DCSK demodulator,
the spreading factor (2β) should be obtained by the de-
modulator in advance so that the information bits can
be recovered correctly. We refer to 2β as key in our en-
cryption methods.
Partial Power Packet Encryption
In the power packet dispatching system, the synchro-
nization is essential to handshake between the sender and
receiver of power packet, that is, the mixer and router.
As shown in Fig. 2, the preamble is designed for achieving
the clock synchronization between the mixer and router
[10]. At the meantime, from the viewpoint of privacy
protect, the header should be hidden during transmis-
sion, because the header may include consumers’ private
information. Therefore the security of information is pos-
sibly established, provided that the preamble and header
are protected. In partial power packet encryption, only
preamble and header are encrypted using DCSK scheme.
The rest of the packet (payload and footer) remains unen-
crypted. The encryption method is illustrated in Fig. 5.
The mixer is integrated with a DCSK modulator and
the router is integrated with a DCSK demodulator. As
shown in this figure, the power packet generated by the
mixer is partially encrypted through the DCSK modu-
lator. The encrypted packet is then transmitted. In
demodulator, the encrypted packet can be recovered if
the key is obtained beforehand as mentioned in section .
The whole packet can be recovered, not only because the
recovered preamble and header suffice to determine the
route of power packet in the router, but also based on
the fact that the unencryption of the payload and footer
guarantees the power in power packet.
Under partial encryption, assume that an attacker ex-
ists in the system during power packet transmission. The
security status of information and power can be ana-
lyzed. Here, we focus on the information contained in
the preamble and header without considering the footer,
since the footer is the end signal of a power packet. When
the packet is caught by the attacker, he can not obtain
information because of the disability of recovering the
packet signals without the key. Therefore, the security of
information is achieved. Nevertheless, the power can be
stolen by the attacker if he connect some device directly
to the power line. It means the security of power can not
be achieved in this method. In addition, the power of
power packet is carried by the payload as mentioned in
section . Therefore, whole power of packet may be stolen
by the attacker since the payload is transmitted without
encryption.
power packet
source1
source2
   DCSK
modulator
mixer router     DCSK
demodulator
load1
load2
encrypted packet recovered packet
power line
attacker
FIG. 5: Diagram of system with partial power packet encryp-
tion. The power packet is partially encrypted by the DCSK
modulator. The encrypted packet is recovered through the de-
modulator before it arrives to the router. Finally, the power
contained in the power packet is delivered to the desired load.
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FIG. 6: Diagram of system with whole power packet encryp-
tion. The whole power packet is encrypted by the DCSK
modulator. The encrypted packet is recovered through the
demodulator before it arrives to the router. Finally, the power
contained in the power packet is delivered to the desired load.
Whole Power Packet Encryption
In order to further improve the security of power packet
dispatching, we propose to encrypt the whole power
packet. Figure 6 shows the whole power packet encryp-
tion method. It is clear that there is no difference in the
security of information between these two methods, since
the preamble and header are encrypted in both meth-
ods. Next, we will discuss about the power. The power
can still be stolen by the attacker if he connects some
devices directly to the power line. However, we should
bear in mind that payload carries the power of packet.
Thus what calls for special attention is that once the pay-
load is encrypted, the power of encrypted packet may be
changed.
The whole encryption method encrypts both informa-
tion tags and payload. It is different from the original
DCSK scheme, where the tranferred signal is digital data
without physical quantity. In order to transfer power,
the DCSK modulator is modified as in Fig. 7. In the
chaos generator, we suppose the generated chaotic sig-
nal carries power for encryption. The data sequence be-
comes the product of chaotic signal and the packet signal.
The voltage amplitude of packet signal is ‘+a’ or ‘–a’ in
volts. Let the payload consists of Nb bits packet signal.
Then the average output power of modulator Pmodout in
watts (W) can be calculated during payload according to
5chaos generator 
 (include power
  for encryption) Delay β 
xk
sk
bldepending on 
 a or  a
xk-β
FIG. 7: Block diagram of modulator used in whole power
packet encryption. This is the modified version of the original
DCSK modulator. a is the absolute voltage amplitude of the
packet signal bl.
Eq. (2) with replacing xk−β by axk−β as follows:
Pmodout =
Nb∑
l=1
(
β∑
m=1
x2lmTx +
β∑
m=1
a2x2lmTx)
NbTb
=
(1 + a2)
Nb∑
l=1
β∑
m=1
x2lm
2βNb
,
(9)
where xlm denotes the m-th sample point of chaotic sig-
nal in the first half bit period of the l-th bit packet signal.
Equation (9) shows the possibility of rescaling the output
power of modulator Pmodout by the voltage amplitude of
packet signal a, the spreading factor 2β, the bit number
of packet signal during payload Nb and chaotic signal.
From the viewpoint of the amount of stolen power, we say
that the power of power packet under whole encryption
becomes more secure compared to the partial encryption
method.
We consider the original power packet is the input of
the modulator and thus the average input power of the
modulator during payload is a2 in watts, since the voltage
of packet signal is constant at a V throughout the pay-
load. Power efficiency of the modulator ηmod is definded
as below,
ηmod =
(1 + a2)
Nb∑
l=1
β∑
m=1
x2lm
2βNba2
. (10)
It corresponds to the ratio of the output power divided
by the input power of the modulator. ηmod is possible
to rescale by a, 2β, Nb, and xk. As a result, the range
of input power can be expanded to meet the demand of
power from loads. This might be another benifit of whole
packet encryption using DCSK scheme.
SIMULATION RESULTS OF TRANSFERRED
POWER
In order to confirm the power transferred through
DCSK modulator in whole encryption case, we build
a model of DCSK modulator in Simulink. In simula-
tions, the power packet shown in Fig. 2 is adopted. From
Eq. (9), the power spectrum of sk is related to the chaotic
signal. Hence we begin with introduction of the chaotic
signal utilized in simulations for analyzing the average
power of sk in payload duration.
In simulations, the chaotic signal xk is produced by the
following normalized improved logistic map [25],
xk+1 =
√
2(1 − x2k). (11)
The sensitive dependence upon initial conditions of the
produced chaotic signal is presented in Fig. 8. Both c1
and c2 in Fig. 8 are produced by Eq. (11) but with dif-
ferent initial conditions as c1(1)=0.75 and c2(1)=0.749.
Next, the auto-correlation function of xk (Rxx[n]) is de-
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FIG. 8: Waveforms of chaotic signals generated by itera-
tive map xk+1 =
√
2(1 − x2k) with different initial values.
c1(1)=0.75, c2(1)=0.749. The time interval between signals
is Tc1 = Tc2 = 0.001 s and the simulation time is 0.1 s, which
implies the length of signals plotted here is Nc1 = Nc2 = 100.
fined as
Rxx[n] = E(xkxk−n), (12)
where n represents the time-lag and E(·) is the expected
value operator. The power spectral density function is
the Fourier transform of the auto-correlation function.
Shown in Figs. 9 and 10 are the numerical approxima-
tions of the auto-correlation function and power spectral
density of xk using finite-length (Nx = 1000) signals, re-
spectively. Figure 9 indicates xk is almost random. The
power spectral density in Fig. 10 shows the wide-band
property of xk, which implies the aperiodicity.
As mentioned above, the power packet in [5] is em-
ployed, thus Nb = 85. We set the initial value of
the chaotic signal x1 at 0.75 without loss of general-
ity. According to Eq. (11), xk is limited in the range
of [−1.4142,+1.4142]. In addition, if the bit length of
packet signal Tb is determined, then the values of xk
during payload can be obtained. The dependency of the
output power of modulator Pmodout on a and 2β can be
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FIG. 9: Normalized approximated auto-correlation of xk,
which is generated by iterative map xk+1 =
√
2(1− x2k) with
x1 = 0.75 and the time step is Tx = 0.001 s. The generated
samples are of finite length 1000.
0 100 200 300 400 500
−50
−45
−40
−35
−30
−25
−20
−15
−10
Frequency (Hz)
Po
w
er
 S
pe
ct
ra
l D
en
sit
y 
(dB
/H
z)
FIG. 10: Approximated power spectral density of xk, which
is generated by the iterative map xk+1 =
√
2(1 − x2k) with
x1 = 0.75 and time step is Tx = 0.001 s. The generated
samples are of finite length 1000.
examined in simulations. We set Tx = Tsam = 0.001 s
without loss of generality. Tsam represents the sampling
period in simulations.
When we fix 2β = 100, the power spectrums of sk
with different values of a (a = 1, a = 2, a = 5, and
a = 10) are obtained as shown in Fig. 11. The ma-
genta lines in these figures show the average power of sk,
which means Pmodout. We refer to the value of Pmodout
obtained from the power spectrum of sk through simula-
tions as Pmodoutsim, as given in Table I. The mean values
of xk and x
2
k are E[xk] = 0.0018 and E[x
2
k] = 1.0067 at
Tsam = 0.001 s and 2β = 100. Then Pmodout can be nu-
merically calculated by Eq. (9) as in Table I. In Table I,
with the increase of a, Pmodout tends to be half of the
input power a2. This can be explained by substituing
E[x2k] = 1.0067 into Eq. (10).
TABLE I: Power transferred through modulator with different
values of a while 2β is fixed at 100. Pmodoutsim and Pmodout
corresponds to simulation result and calculation result, re-
spectively.
a/V 1 2 5 10
Pmodoutsim/W 1.007 2.517 13.09 50.84
Pmodout/W 1.0067 2.51675 13.0871 50.83835
Keeping a = 2 the power spectrum of sk is considered
for 2β (2β =50, 100, 500, and 1000). The power spec-
trums are obtained as in Fig. 12. Similarly, Pmodoutsim
are listed in Table III. E[x2k] is obtained through itera-
tion as in Table II. E[x2k] are different because the num-
ber of samples varies with 2β. However, the difference is
small due to the random feature of chaotic siganl. Then
Pmodout with different 2β can also be calculated according
to Eq. (9), as given in Table III. We can see that Pmodout
almost keep the same with the change of 2β. It can be
explained by Eq. (9) and Table II. According to Eq. (9),
Pmodout depends only on E[x
2
k] when a, 2β, and Nb are
known. According to Table II, the values of E[x2k] with
different 2β changes little, and thus Pmodout are almost
the same.
TABLE II: Mean values of x2k (E[x
2
k]) during payload with
different values of 2β while a is fixed at 2.
2β 50 100 500 10000
E[x2k] 1.0065 1.0067 1.0046 0.9996
TABLE III: Power transferred through modulator with differ-
ent values of 2β while a is fixed at 2. Pmodoutsim and Pmodout
corresponds to simulation result and calculation result, re-
spectively.
2β 50 100 500 1000
Pspay/W 2.516 2.517 2.512 2.499
Pmodout/W 2.51625 2.51675 2.5115 2.499
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed to encrypt power packets
before sending them in a power packet dispatching sys-
tem for the purpose of protecting the content of power
packets. At first, we summarized the principles of the
DCSK scheme referring to other researchers’ work. Then
partial power packet encryption method using DCSK
scheme was proposed. The security of information and
70 100 200 300 400 500
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4 x 10
−3
Frequency (Hz)
Po
w
er
/F
re
qu
en
cy
 (W
/H
z)
 
 
power spectrum, a=1
average power/1000
(a)
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 x 10
−3
Frequency (Hz)
Po
w
er
/F
re
qu
en
cy
 (W
/H
z)
 
 
power spectrum, a=2
average power/1000
(b)
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
Frequency (Hz)
Po
w
er
/F
re
qu
en
cy
 (W
/H
z)
 
 
power spectrum, a=5
average power/1000
(c)
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Frequency (Hz)
Po
w
er
/F
re
qu
en
cy
 (W
/H
z)
 
 
power spectrum, a=10
average power/1000
(d)
FIG. 11: Power spectrum of DCSK modulator output signal sk in simulations with different values of a, while Tsam = 0.001 s
and 2β = 100. The data is limited in payload duration. Tsam is the sampling period in simulations, 2β the spreading factor
and a the absolute amplitude of packet signal in volts. (a) a = 1; (b) a = 2; (c) a = 5; (d) a = 10. The magenta line represents
the value of average power of sk in payload duration.
power of packet were discussed, seperately. Next, we
proposed to encrypt the whole power packet in order to
further improve the security. The power of encrypted
power packet was then examined in simulations.
Applying power packet encryption, the information of
packet is protected from attackers. The power is pro-
tected in a certain extent from the viewpoint of the
amount of stolen power. In addition, due to the prin-
ciples of DCSK scheme, the power of packet after whole
encryption can be rescaled. This might be a potential
advantage to expand the range of power sources to meet
the demand of loads.
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